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SUMMARY: Undeniable signature protocols were introduced at Crypto '89 
[CA]. The present article contains new undeniable signature protocols, and these 
are the first that are zero-knowledge. 
INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION 
Digital signatures [DH] are easily verified as authentic by anyone using the 
corresponding public key. This "self-authenticating" property is quite suitable for 
some uses, such as broadcast of announcements and public-key certificates. But 
it is unsuitable for many other applications. Self-authentication makes signatures 
that are somewhat commercially or personally sensitive, for instance, much more 
valuable to the industrial spy or extortionist. 
Thus, self-authentication is too much authentication for many applications. 
On the other hand, the remaining previously known authentication schemes offer 
too little authentication. A judge or arbiter cannot use them to re~olve disputes as 
is possible with self authentication. With zero-knowledge "identification" 
techniques, for example, a judge would not be convinced of anything by a 
transcript of the interaction, because by definition anyone could generate 
indistinguishable transcripts. Also with conventional "identify-friend-or-foe" 
protocols, or any other system where both parties have all relevant secret keys, 
the cryptography cannot stop either party from producing valid transcripts. 
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In short, cooperation of the signer should be necessary to convince another 
party that a particular signature is valid-but a signer, falsely accused of having 
signed a particular message, should be able to prove his innocence. 
Undeniable Signatures 
The relatively new technique called "undeniable signatures" [CA] achieves 
these objectives. An undeniable signature, like a digital signature, is a number 
issued by a signer that depends on the signer's public key as well as on the 
message signed. Unlike a digital signature, however, an undeniable signature 
cannot be verified without cooperation of the signer. 
The validity or invalidity of an undeniable signature can be ascertained by 
conducting a protocol with the signer, assuming the signer participates. If a 
"confirmation" protocol is used, the cooperating signer gives exponentially-high 
certainty to the verifier that the signature does correspond to the message and the 
signer's public key. If instead a "disavowal" protocol is conducted, the signer 
gives exponentially-high certainty that the signature does not correspond to the 
message and the signer's public key. In both protocols a cheating signer, even 
with infinite computing power, has only an exponentially small chance of success 
and an overwhelming probability of being detected. 
Applications 
Undeniable signatures are preferable to digital signatures for many upcoming 
applications. 
Consider, for example, the signature a software supplier may issue on its 
software, allowing customers to check that the software is genuine and 
unmodified. With undeniable signatures, only paying customers are able to verify 
the signature, and they are ensured that the supplier remains accountable for the 
software. 
All manner of inter-organizational messages, such as so called EDI, are a 
natural candidate for signatures that provide for dispute resolution. But self-
authentication would greatly increase the illicit salability of such information. 
Also for personal transactions, non-repudiation may be an essential 
component of security for the service provider; but the customer would like to 
ensure that, for instance, the signatures do not later end up in the newspaper. 
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Outline 
First the underlying cryptography and form of a signature will be presented, which 
are the same as in [CA]. Then the new confirmation protocol will be described in 
detail and its security argued. Next the new disavowal protocol is presented 
followed by sketches of proofs for its properties. Finally some more recent results 
are discussed. 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SETTING AND SIGNATURES 
Consider using the group of known prime order p. All values transmitted 
between the participants are elements of this group, the multiplicatively denoted 
group operation is easily computed by all participants, and taking the discrete log 
in the group is assumed to be computationally infeasible. 
One potentially suitable representation is the multiplicative group of the field 
GF(2n), where p = 2n-1 is prime. A second is the group of squares modulo prime 
q, where q = 2p+l. (Notice that such choices rule out the Pohlig-Hellman attack 
on the discrete log [PH].) An attractive variation on the second approach 
represents group elements by the integers 1 top; the group operation is the same, 
except that all results are normalized by taking the additive inverse exactly when 
this yields a smaller least positive representative. 
A suitable group of prime order p and a primitive element g are initially 
established and made public for use by a set of signers. Consider a particular 
signer Shaving a private key x and a corresponding public key gx. A message rn 
(t:l) is signed by S to form a signature, denoted z, which should be equal to mX. 
Computing the private key from the public key, assuming only random 
messages are signed, is the the discrete log problem; forging signatures on 
random messages is at least as hard as breaking Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
CONFIRMATION PROTOCOL 
A verifier V receiving z, which is claimed to be the signature of signer S on 
message m and thus equal to mx, can establish the signature's validity using the 
confirmation protocol of Figure 1. 
Signer 
q 
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Fig. 1. Confirmation protocol 
Each party should initially choose secret random group elements uniformly: 
S chooses q and V chooses a and b. The first message is formed by V as shown by 
the first arrow of Figure 1. The second message arrow shows the response of S 
as a pair of group elements. Next V sends a and b in message 3 so that S can 
reconstruct the first message. Only once this reconstruction is successful does S 
send message 4 to reveal q. Finally, by substituting z for mx, V can reconstruct 
message 2 and ensure that it was formed properly. 
SECURITY OF CONFIRMATION 
There are two essential properties: 
Theorem 1: The protocol of Figure 1 is zero-knowledge [GivlR]. 
Proof: If V sends a message 3 that should result in a message 4 being sent, V can 
form the message 2 determined by any random message 4. Any V not sending 
such a valid message 3 does not receive message 4, but can simulate the 
message 2 pair as gY and gXJ, by choosing y as a random group element. 
Theorem 2: Even with infinite computing power S cannot with probability 
exceeding p-1 provide a valid response for an invalid signature. 
Proof: Essentially the same argument as that of [CA] suffices. 
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DISAVOWAL PROTOCOL 
An alleged signer may wish to convince a verifier that a particular message z is 
not a valid signature corresponding to the signer's public key gx and message m, 
i.e. that z :f. mx. To do this, the alleged signer cooperates in an instance of a 
disavowal protocol. The signer can cheat with probability l/(k+l), where k is a 
mutually agreed constant and order k operations must be performed by the signer. 
In practice k might be 1023, for instance, and the protocol could be conducted 2 
times for a chance of cheating that is less than one in a million or 10 times to give a 
chance of only 2-100. 
Signer 
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Verifier 
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a 
r 
Fig. 2. Disavowal protocol 
Consider a single use of the protocol of Figure 2. Initially V chooses an 
integers uniformly between 0 and k and chooses a independently and uniformly 
over the group elements. The first arrow shows how the pair of values sent by V 
should be formed. Now S can determine the value of s by trial and error. An 
efficient approach for this raises the first component of the message to the x 
power and forms a quotient with the second component. The k+ 1 trial quotients 
can then be computed each by a single multiply from the quotient of the valid 
signature with z. (Since these quotients are independent of a they can be used for 
multiple instances of the protocol.) If no s is found, S uses a random value. 
Next S sends message 2 containing a blob [BCC] committing to the value of 
s, but hidings until the randomly selected r is revealed. (An attractive example is 
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multivalued-blobs based on the discrete log problem that protect the verifier 
unconditionally, as described in [BCC] §§6.6 and 6.2.2.) Upon receiving the blob 
as message 2, V can send a. And before finally providing r as the final message, S 
checks that a can be used to reconstruct the first message. 
SECURITY OF DISAVOW AL 
Again two things are proved: 
Theorem 3: The protocol of Figure 2 is zero-knowledge. 
Proof: An interaction in which V sends the correct a, which V can always 
recognize, is trivially simulated. Any V not supplying an acceptable a only 
receives a blob, and so the type of zero-knowledge depends on the type of blob. 
Theorem 4: Even with infinite computing power S cannot with probability 
exceeding l/(k+ 1) provide a valid response for a valid signature. 
Proof: if z = mX, a hides s perfectly in the first message. Since the value 
committed to by the blob cannot be changed, S's best strategy is to guess s. 
RECENT WORK 
One new result is "convertible" undeniable signatures [BCDP]. These allow the 
signer to make a single value public that turns all of his undeniable signatures into 
self-authenticating digital signatures. The signer does not lose the exclusive ability 
to make signatures and can even selectively convert individual signatures. 
The author is aware of some work in preparation: 
A signer can "distribute" his undeniable signature signing and/or disavowal 
abilities among a set of trustees in such a way that a majority of the trustees are 
necessary and sufficient to perform these functions. 
By confirming signatures on random messages in advance, a signer can later 
simply send, such as by electronic mail, undeniable signatures that the recipient 
can confirm without further interaction. 
The confirmation and disavowal protocols remain zero-knowledge even if 
multiple instances are conducted in parallel, because of the initial commitment 
made by the verifier. Another consequence of such "verifier commit" protocols is 
that it can be made infeasible for covertly cooperating verifiers to be convinced 
by choosing their single challenge based on coin-flips. 
Blobs formed from undeniable signatures can be used to show that the 
signer can satisfy an agreed predicate. These proofs require only a few messages 
because blob opening is a parallelizeable confirmation protocol. Such proofs are 
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"undeniable" in the sense that anyone who trusts the randomness of the 
challenges can later conduct either the confirmation or disavowal protocol with 
the singer and be convinced whether or not the proof transcript is valid. 
CONCLUSION 
Undeniable signatures that are Zero-Knowledge can be achieved. They are 
essentially as efficient in confirmation, and nearly so in disavowal, as other known 
undeniable signature schemes. 
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